Empirical Study of Deterrence in the Context of Great Power Competition
Principal Investigator: Renard Sexton, Emory University
Co-Principal Investigator: Eddy Yeung, Emory University (PhD Student)
Years of award: 2024-2027
Managing service agency: Air Force Office of Scientific Research
Project Description:
Deterrence is central to the resistance to coercive threats and the prevention of international wars. Given the centrality of deterrence in international security, early scholarship analyzed theoretically the conditions under which deterrence succeeds or fails. Despite rich propositions from theoretical contributions, empirically we still know little about whether, when, and how deterrence strategies initiated by a defender can deter a potential attacker from crisis escalation.
Our proposed research examines both sides of deterrence: defenders and aggressors. On the defender side, we empirically assess whether state-based or non-state (civil society) actions taken by a defender can boost domestic resolve and capabilities, key ingredients for deterrence. On the aggressor side, we investigate how citizens (crucial for political support for a risky attack) respond to these actions. We conduct a series of observational and experimental studies to see how hypothetical and real actions may bolster deterrence, especially whether signals sent are indeed received as intended.